Emirati dominance – takeovers of more ports in Africa

Africa is a continent of opportunity. It was understood differently by the colonial empires of the 19th century, the approach to the Dark Continent after the decolonisation wave of the 1960s and the image of the area in the first three decades of the 21st century. This is recognised by global actors such as the United States, the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, India and Iran. However, this does not mean that the element of rivalry is the exclusive domain of the great powers. African strategy and politics have also become the focus of countries geographically located on the Arabian Peninsula. One of these is the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which is economising its foreign policy and building influence in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and then turning its attention towards West Africa.

Emirati cornerstone

The UAE’s interest in the African continent has been in flux over the past decades, but never as great as it is today. This is primarily due to the post-Cold War, growing independence from other powers and the internal situation of the monarchy itself. A structured vision for the Emirates began to take shape at the beginning of the 21st century, with the financial crisis of 2008 being the turning point.

The United Arab Emirates, especially the emirate of Dubai, experienced a severe economic crisis as a result of the global financial collapse. Dubai’s booming property market led to huge investments and borrowing , which proved impossible to repay when property prices plummeted and many construction projects were put on hold. The crisis revealed the emirate’s financial problems and indebtedness of the emirate, which forced the need for international aid and debt restructuring. Property values in Dubai fell by up to 50% at the height of the recession.

Abu Dhabi’s concepts can therefore be described as the economisation of foreign policy through the export of energy resources (mainly oil, which has been and still is the country’s budget revenue), the development of foreign investment and the involvement in trade, also as an intermediary. The novelty of the ongoing projects, among the Arabian Peninsula countries, is the focus on Africa.

The Dark Continent is very close

The UAE’s position-building on the African continent can be characterised on a number of levels. One of these is the acquisition of concessions for the use and operation of infrastructure, including maritime infrastructure. »Abu Dhabi’s »port diplomacy« is carried out overwhelmingly by two tycoons linked to the royal family. These are Dubai Ports World (DP World; DPW) and Abu Dhabi Ports Group (AD Ports Group). The establishment of economic outposts in strategic coastal areas of Africa (including the Gulf of Guinea, the Suez Canal and the Strait of Bab-Al-Mandab) serves to control sea lanes and establish Jebel Ali Port in Dubai a strategic hub connecting Asian and African markets - creating the impression of a Chinese route and belt.

The Emiratis have spent the last 16 years creating an infrastructural hegemon on the African continent. In the Maghreb, the DP World entity was awarded a 30-year concession to handle containers in 2008. At Guinea’s Kamsar port, Abu Dhabi Ports Group has been operating since 2016. A container terminal in Maputo, Mozambique, and a »dry port« in South Africa’s Komatipoort are operated by DP World, as are projects in the Horn of Africa. The Red Sea and the Suez Canal, on the other hand, are the domain of the aforementioned AD Ports Group.

DP World, headquartered in Dubai, specialises in port management, container terminals and logistics services. The company operates worldwide, serving key transport hubs and supporting international trade. DP World is one of the of the world’s largest port and logistics operators, and plays an important role in the global supply chain.

DPW continues its business expansion southwards. Across the Red Sea and the Bab-al-Mandab Strait, and from Egypt to Somalia, one of the world’s largest port operators also has a presence in Africa’s business hub, Kenya. The Dubai giant signed an agreement in 2021 to develop the Dongo Kundu industrial zone, near the port of Mombasa. The Emirati company had been working for years to gain a foothold in Kenya. Initially, DP World negotiated an ambitious contract covering four concessions: the ports of Mombasa, Lamu and Kisumu and the Naivasha dry port. Significantly, in 2023, the entity finalised a 30-year contract resulting in the operation of the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam.

Observing the current activities on the African continent, a particular interest in the east coast is apparent at first glance. The Emiratis stop at the Mozambique Channel and do not target False Bay, the Gulf of Guinea or the Cape Verde Islands. This policy can be described by the slogan »from Egypt to Mozambique«, where the UAE is conquering East African ports very spectacularly. Abu Dhabi is building its influence using a logistics giant, precisely Dubai Ports World, along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean as an alternative to its economic and security interests.

Like China on the »new Silk Roads«, Abu Dhabi is weaving a necklace of pearls in East Africa. Despite difficulties in Djibouti to communicate with the authorities, and in Eritrea, from which it recently withdrew, port authority extends across the continent’s eastern façade precisely thanks to the two giants DP World and Abu Dhabi Ports and very active diplomacy.

The Bab-al-Mandab, the fourth »busiest« strait in the world, handles 40% of the world’s maritime trade and handles the transportation of more than 6 million barrels of oil per day. Securing this location is crucial for an export powerhouse such as Abu Dhabi.

Economic expansion is not the only rationale driven by the UAE and its associated related infrastructure conglomerates. The establishment of maritime links also focuses on the pursuit of geopolitical objectives, and port diplomacy appears as the first link in a long chain characterised by the need to ensure food security, export Emirati armaments, establish military bases or build international standing and rivalry with other powers.

The first link – food

The tropical desert climate, within which there is practically no rainfall and temperatures reach 45 degrees Celsius, leads to the fact that the Emirate’s food needs must be met in cooperation with global partners. 90% of the national food demand is imported. The UAE has positioned itself, alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, as a major buyer of agricultural land in African countries (this practice is called landgrabbing).

Strategic farmland acquisitions are being made by Abu Dhabi in Nigeria, Morocco, Ghana, Namibia or Sudan. In the latter, Emirati investors have purchased more than 400,000 hectares of land, and Al Dahra Agriculture, a company controlled by Muhammad Ibn Zajid’s brother (the current president of the UAE), signed a billion-dollar agreement in 2015 for the use of land in the Al-Jawad Valley.

Last year, the transitional government in Khartoum signed a concession agreement worth US$6 billion with Abu Dhabi Ports to build a new port terminal 200km north of Port Sudan. It will include a special economic zone, an airport and 168,000 hectares of agricultural space.

The monarchy is building its international position

One measure of Emirati success is the establishment of nine new embassies in sub-Saharan African countries between 2010 and 2020. Abu Dhabi’s turn to the south of the continent was prompted by the events of the Arab Spring and its repercussions for Tunisia or Egypt. In this way, the Emirates wanted to create an alternative political direction that would make the UAE independent of North African leaders with connections to the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Arabian Peninsula country’s actions can be likened to China’s economic policy towards Africa. The Emirates are willing to finance African dictatorships and contractors close to power. The only condition is the acceptance of the UAE’s strategic interests on the African continent, on the Arabian Peninsula and in the international arena.

The UAE-Qatar rivalry has led to a situation where Abu Dhabi, in its dealings with countries in the Horn of Africa, the Maghreb or the sub-Saharan region, has played a zero-sum game - »either you are with us or talk to Doha«. This allowed the Emirates to win over, among others, the Sahel states, Comoros, Gabon and some West African countries, but the rest of Africa was not involved in the »Arab dispute«. An interesting case, however, is Rwanda, which, despite simultaneously reviving relations with Qatar and the UAE, was able to reap benefits from both sides - the Emirati DP World built a logistics base in Kigali and Doha financed the national airport.

Investing? Then protect it!

The billion-dollar contracts and port concessions that Emirati conglomerates have been receiving for at least two decades must have entailed co-optation at the military level. It is no revelation that, when locating capital in a place, a contractor wants to earn the maximum amount of money or obtain some other good (often intangible). The vision of earning for investment in Africa is often disrupted by the activity of terrorist organisations or internal conflicts. For this reason, the UAE authorities, having decided to expand economically, have also had to decide to build military bases in strategic locations and strengthen the military capabilities of their partners.

Abu Dhabi’s security activities can be characterised by three successive periods: entry into the competition (2010 - 2016), power projection (2016 - 2021) and protecting and strengthening the established position (from 2021 - present).

The first phase was marked by the probing of the environment, the signing of the first agreements to provide training for the armed forces of the East African and Sahel countries. Also noteworthy is a fact that will have an impact on the continued presence of the UAE in Africa, namely the participation in NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, which aimed to establish a no-fly zone over the Libyan skies and topple Mu’ammar Al-Qaddafi.

The Emirati contribution to North Atlantic Alliance operations consisted of mission support by six F-16 fighters (E/F Block 60 Falcon variant) and a further six Dassault Mirage 2000 aircraft from Decimomannu Air Base in Italy. Since 2010, military services of training operations were carried out in cooperation with Somalia and its autonomous region of Puntaland, the internationally unrecognised Somaliland, with which the UAE nevertheless maintains informal relations, Ethiopia, Chad, Mauritania and Morocco.

The establishment of security relationships has in some cases followed the economic installation of DP World and AD Ports Group in African countries. Since 2010, as many as six countries on the continent that have signed agreements to provide concessions to Emirati entities have finalised arms industry cooperation agreements - these were the DRC, Angola, Tanzania, Egypt, Senegal, Mozambique and Somaliland has also joined.

The trajectory of Emirati investment in Africa and the key role of maritime trade for Abu Dhabi (and within this the need to control the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden or the Arabian Sea) reflected a pattern of installing military outposts in the Horn of Africa, Libya or the Sahel.

Another piece in the Emirati jigsaw was an installation in Libya’s Al-Khadim, which had served UAE interests since 2016, with the UAE carrying out air strikes in Libya in support of Khalifa Haftar’s forces from 2019-2020. However, the military outpost did not operate in isolation. Indeed, it was calibrated with a facility in Egypt’s Sidi Barani, where Emirati transport and military aircraft had been operating since 2016.

The significance of the Bab-Al-Mandab Strait area, which is strategic to Abu Dhabi, led to the establishment of a military airport in Somaliland’s Berbera in 2017 to support the realisation of interests in Yemen and the Gulf of Aden. The withdrawal of the UAE from Sanaa led to the modernisation of the project, resulting in the establishment of a civilian airport in 2021.

UAE in the Horn of Africa

It is important to remember the Emirati presence in the Horn of Africa, especially in the context of the conflicts in the Gulf. The high militarisation of the region, primarily linked to the war in Yemen, is a challenge for the Arab powers. The Emirates have been looking to establish their military bases along the East African coast to provide logistical support for future military operations.

A base in the Eritrean city of Assab has become an important foothold for Abu Dhabi. In 2015, the UAE was granted a 30-year lease of the deep-water port and the ability to use Eritrean airspace and territorial waters for military operations in Yemen. Until 2019, UAE military vehicles and drones operated in Assab and trained allied Yemeni and Sudanese militias.

Thus, the base in Assab, Eritrea, enabled the UAE Navy to maintain its blockade of Yemen, launch its drones there, and also served as a transit point for mercenaries arriving from Mauritania and Sudan (generally the Sahel) going to Yemen to take part in the fighting. The base was partially dismantled by the United Arab Emirates in 2021 when Emirati troops completed their withdrawal from Yemen.

At the same time, in the Horn of Africa, DP World is developing the Emirates military-industrial complex. Whether at Port Berbera (Somaliland) or Bosaso (Puntland, Somalia), part of DP World’s port concessions are included in agreements for cooperation, modernisation of military bases and funding of local fleets to combat piracy in the Gulf of Aden. The UAE is supporting the region in the security dimension and at the same time building up its own military capital.

The Emirates have managed to ally with Ethiopia, Somalia, the self-proclaimed republic of Somaliland, and the (unrecognised) autonomous state of Puntland to establish military ties and obtain port services. In early 2024, an Abu Dhabi-sponsored agreement requiring Ethiopia to gain access to the sea off Somaliland provokes the ire of Mogadishu, which denounces the violation of its territorial sovereignty.

The Horn of Africa is the most important logistics centre on the continent and is the gateway to several central African markets: Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan and Uganda. The area is rich in minerals and rare earth elements, which Abu Dhabi is seeking to acquire.

As for Sudan, between June and September 2023, more than 100 transport planes linked the UAE with Chad. Under the guise of a humanitarian mission, the UAE simply rented a runway from the Chadian government to deliver weapons to its ally in Sudan.

UAE, Africa and gold

The African gold rush is not just reserved for Kremlin-linked power structures. It turns out that one of the biggest importers of gold from The Dark Continent is the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi’s acquisition of this bullion intensified in 2008, when the world was in the throes of the financial crisis. This was due to rising gold prices and informal, often illegal, contracts with Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, Togo, Uganda, Tanzania or Rwanda.

US$30 billion worth of gold is exported illegally (no official registration) from Africa every year. More than $4 billion worth of gold mined in conflict zones in Central and East Africa is transported to international markets each year and East Africa, 95% of which arrives in Dubai through smuggling networks and sometimes with the complicity of some actors - such as General Hemetti in Sudan. Illicit trade and investment is growing. For example, Russia finances its military operations in Africa and Ukraine with gold from Sudan.

Ghana is the largest gold producer on the continent, followed by Mali, South Africa and Sudan. The largest customer, registered and unregistered, is the UAE. Gold is often refined in the UAE and then either re-exported or sold on the domestic market.

All that glitters is not gold so the Emirates is also keen to invest in other mining sectors that will accelerate the UAE’s energy transition. In July this year, Abu Dhabi, through International Resources Holding, acquired a 51% stake in Zambia’s Mopani Copper Mines. The transaction amounted to US$1.1 billion.

Africa’s struggle against terrorism

The growing terrorist threat in areas where the UAE is involved has led Abu Dhabi to increase its focus on the issue. In addition to the threat of Muslim fundamentalism, another non-state threat is pirates operating in the Horn of Africa. As early as 2012, the UAE began funding and training the security services of the autonomous Puntland and worked to minimise the impact of Somali pirates.

The Emirati war on terror in the Horn of Africa took on a kinetic dimension in 2023, as Abu Dhabi then conducted its first military operation against the Somali organisation Al-Shabab, which defines the Emirates as existential enemies supporting the government in Mogadishu. In addition to this, in January this year, the UAE and Somalia signed an agreement to strengthen military relations to combat the threat of terrorism, build relevant institutions, train law enforcement and security of Somalia, and expanding counter-terrorism activities to Uganda and Ethiopia. 2 months later, Abu Dhabi deployed an additional military contingent to the Jubaland region. In response, the organisation carried out a terrorist attack in February 2024, resulting in the death of 3 UAE soldiers.

Somali neighbours Kenya and Ethiopia are also reliable security partners for the Emirates. Already in 2018, Nairobi received nine Fennec helicopters from Abu Dhabi, which were used to combat Al-Shabab, and a year later Global Aerospace Logistics signed an agreement with the Kenyan Air Force regarding the servicing of its fighter fleet.

Industry agreements and the execution of contracts by Emirati companies have become a permanent feature of the country’s arms diplomacy. The real boom in »made in UAE« armaments came in the third decade of the 21st century. In 2021, the UAE delivered 30 Calidus MCAV-20 tactical armoured vehicles to the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Ugandan National Corporation of Enterprises then signed an agreement with the Emirati Streit Group, through which Kuguar and Kobra armoured vehicles would be produced on Ugandan territory.

The Sahel has also become a transmission belt for Emirati engagement. In 2016, the UAE established the Mohammed bin Zayed Defence College military academy in Mauritania to train G5-SAHEL forces. In 2017, Abu Dhabi donated $35 million to support the G5 Sahel Joint Force. The Emirate has been involved in French counter-terrorism projects in the region and in 2021 donated a C-130 transport aircraft to support the French Barkhane mission. The failure of the Paris operation, the disintegration of the G5 structures and military coups have created a new situation for the UAE in the Sahel region. Between 2018 and 2023, Abu Dhabi has committed $750 million in development aid to former G5 countries.

The primary threat to Ibn Zajid’s foreign strategy will be the increasing danger posed by radical terrorist organisations in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, where DP World and AD Ports Group investments are under attack. The growing strength of the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP) could lead to an intensification of military coups in the region and the need to establish short-term relations with juntas. The terrorist threat, which has a significant impact on trade in the Red Sea, is also rising in the Bab-Al-Mandab Strait, where Yemeni Houthis are active. Therefore, the United Arab Emirates should aim to maintain military installations in Somalia and build coalitions in the Horn of Africa, where tensions are increasing between Emirati allies, including Egypt, Somalia, and Ethiopia.

A potential partner in combating the terrorist threat in East Africa is Rwanda, which has been supporting the Mozambican government in Cabo Delgado province since 2021, where Islamic State jihadists are active. Emirati-Rwandan cooperation in this country is all the more likely given that in 2022, Abu Dhabi signed an agreement with Maputo regarding cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The countries agreed to share information and expertise on countering the financing of terrorism.

The Sahel Means Coup

The UAE understands the complexity of the political and military situation in the Sahel. Long-standing relationships allow them to strengthen their presence, even in the event of a coup. This is how the Emirati authorities approach Mali, and previously its president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. In 2019, the two countries signed a military agreement regarding the training of the Malian army. This was followed by the delivery of 30 MRAP Typhoon vehicles and 30 Kuguar vehicles to Bamako.

Strengthening security ties with Sahel states was driven by the rampant expansion of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State cells in the region. The seizure of power by the Malian junta in 2020 and the ousting of President Keïta initially met with disapproval, as the Emirates lost a reliable partner in a strategic part of Africa. However, morality did not prevail, and in the cases of both Mali and Burkina Faso, Abu Dhabi decided to normalise relations with the military governments, recognising that the stakes involved the security of their investments and regional rivalry with Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Algeria.

An interesting case is last year’s coup in Niger, which was condemned by the UAE authorities. They called for the maintenance of stability and support for constitutional order. However, before President Mohammed Bazoum was ousted, Muhammad Ibn Zayed had expressed a desire to establish an Emirati base in Niger, a proposal that was firmly rejected by the Nigerien president.

In response, Abu Dhabi may have supported General Abdourahamane Tchiani in finalising the takeover of power (coup) in Niger. The primary goal for the Emirates remains the creation of conditions for more effective monitoring of developments in Libya, Chad, and Algeria, which is an unquestionable priority for the Emirates.

For many years, Chad has been a key partner for the Emirates in the Sahel region. In June 2023, Abu Dhabi signed an agreement with Chad regarding the stationing of troops and the delivery of six armoured vehicles to combat the Islamic State in West Africa. This agreement fully materialised in January of this year, as the Emirati contingent has been operating in N’Djamena since then.

The reason for the UAE’s interest in Chad is the ongoing civil war in Sudan. With the airbase in Amdjarass operational since 2023, Abu Dhabi can provide military assistance to the forces of Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as „Hemetti.” Additionally, a field hospital has been established in the same location, where refugees and Hemetti’s fighters receive medical treatment.

In the game of alliances, Chad has diversified its security partnerships with the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Hungary. This is particularly important for Mahamat Idriss Déby, who is aware that his privileged relationship with Paris, inherited from his father, is being challenged by some of his associates. As a result, the UAE emerges as an ideal partner for cooperation.

Africa is a continent of the future for the Emirates

With these words, Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, Chairman and CEO of DP World, emphasised the significance and importance of the African continent for the global strategy of the United Arab Emirates. Abu Dhabi will continue to solidify relationships with established partners such as Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno, who cemented his power in this year’s presidential elections. The maintenance of an Emirati military base in Chad will enable the UAE to conduct regional operations in Sudan, Libya, and West African countries. Furthermore, the strong relationship with France (which has military bases in the UAE) will facilitate the building of additional alliances. Thus, a strong position in East Africa is expected to enable the establishment of an influence zone extending from Central Africa to West Africa.

Over the past decade, the Emirates have risen to the position of the fourth largest global investor in Africa—behind China, the European Union, and the United States—investing nearly $60 billion from 2012 to 2022, with plans to invest an additional $10 billion by 2026. This engagement has led to the practical acquisition of the Ras Al-Hikma coastline on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, with a record investment of $35 billion aimed at developing a major tourist complex. Africa is a cornerstone of the UAE’s investment plans. The Dubai Chamber of Commerce now registers 26,000 African companies, an increase of 5,000 from 2020.

The United Arab Emirates demonstrate that it is possible to invest in Africa today and achieve substantial benefits. The decision to develop logistical capabilities while simultaneously building infrastructure is profitable for both parties. The UAE’s next target will be investments in West Africa, followed by the Mediterranean, and potentially, if suitable partners are found, even the Baltic Sea. Currently, the African continent offers an excellent opportunity for expanding potential, and the UAE is becoming one of the most important partners in the context of supply chains. „Port diplomacy” is emerging as a key component of their international policy.

The UAE is likely to continue its strategy of investing in and taking over key ports in Africa. This trend reflects its ambition to become a dominant player in global trade and logistics. The extent of this influence will depend on its ability to navigate local political landscapes, manage geopolitical tensions, and continue securing partnerships with African governments.

Authors: Dr. Aleksander Olech, Konrad Markiewicz