"Eagle Attack" at the Polish border. China is flexing its strategic muscles

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army units will be trained with the Belarusian troops at a training ground right next to the Polish border (in Brest) from July 8 to 19, 2024. The information mentioned above sparked a discussion about the importance of the event itself right now and here. But also about its repercussions for the future development of the situation in the region (or even in a global sense due to the position of the People’s Republic of China).

We discuss this primarily because Belarus is actively involved in destabilizing borders and—more broadly—cross-border security with NATO/EU countries (led by Poland). It was thanks to the actions of the regime in Minsk—taking into account, of course, the participation of the Russian side—that artificial migration pressure was created. It is worth emphasizing that Belarusian-Russian activities against Polish, Lithuanian, and Latvian were observed in this regard, with many modifications and variations in the use of migration tools. That is why the Belarusian regime and its actions need to be analyzed more deeply when we see such military activity in 2024.

The choice of time and place was not accidental

Moreover, in the last month, there has been a noticeable creation of a narrative by the Belarusian propaganda apparatus regarding increasing tension on the border with Ukraine. On Defence24, you can read a more extensive analysis of this topic. However, to simplify, the Belarusian authorities create a picture of tension related to the activities of the Ukrainian army, intelligence, and border guards, to which they must respond. Of course, by increasing the militarization of the border and, for example, by dislocation of their special forces units in the contested area.

It is not without reason that the joint Belarusian-Chinese exercises will take place in the background of the considerations of NATO leaders during the Summit in Washington. Let us note that there, on the 75th anniversary of the NATO system, a lot of space can be devoted to the growing cooperation between NATO and its strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. Therefore, we cannot avoid recognizing that when, according to Chinese propaganda, NATO enters the space of activity of China’s strategic interests, the Chinese will emphasize their actions on NATO’s strategic eastern flank. Symbols play an important role in contemporary international politics.

Therefore, in the context of the presence of Chinese forces in Belarus, the first aspect worth paying attention to is the term „anti-terrorist activities.” It appears in the description of the maneuvers themselves and, at first glance, can be assessed as a neutral purpose of military exercises, many of which are carried out throughout the world throughout the year. However, even on a deeper analysis, it is necessary to notice specific signals sent by using this type of formulation in the context of the China-Russia-Belarus dependency triangle.

We must emphasize that such a political and military venture on the territory of Belarus cannot be positioned only in bilateral relations with China. However, returning to the topic relating to the description of the maneuvers themselves, „terrorism” has indeed become a catchy concept in the 21st century, and the fight against it (including preparation for anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities) has been accepted and is treated in a very positive way.

In the following years of the 21st century, the same terrorism that was positioned as a manifestation of fighting mainly Al-Qaeda and Daish (the so-called Islamic State) repeatedly became the best propaganda camouflage. And this is one used for many activities that have nothing to do with the reality of fighting terrorists. States using such a reference cut off much of the discussion relating to the purposes of their military exercises or international maneuvers regarding the delicate area of military cooperation and secret services. A pattern of action has emerged - countries wanting to avoid accusations of escalating their political and military activities indicate that they cooperate in the fight against terrorism and train for this mission.

Non-democratic states fighting against "color revolutions"

This modus operandi was evident in the case of numerous maneuvers of forces (not only armed forces but also other paramilitary and uniformed formations) in non-democratic countries. In their case, anti-terrorist maneuvers were aimed at building preparedness for fighting, for example, the so-called „extremism,” i.e., the de facto suppression of political opposition actions or making direct actions against ethnic minorities.

Let us note that the aim of many of the Chinese-Russian maneuvers after the wave of the so-called Color Revolutions was a symbolic demonstration of the unity of both countries in actions against similar political actions in the future. To put it clearly, regimes without democratic legitimacy wanted to reinforce the belief that they could and would be able to respond to attempts at democratic changes (treated as a strategic challenge). At the same time, it could be considered as real training in activities to suppress all signs of disobedience in their territory, but also in „brotherly” countries whose threatened non-democratic regimes may request such intervention.

Therefore, maneuvers „Eagle Assault-2024” on Belarus can also be treated in the context of the Chinese side preparing to potentially strengthen the actions of the Belarusian regime in the event of similar or larger democratic protests like those in 2020. Primarily, the Russians are involved in the aggression with large numbers of armed forces in Ukraine, and their participation in „brotherhood” assistance to the Lukashenko regime could involve numerous problems in the future (from the mental sphere to practical logistics).

It may be necessary to notice whether the Chinese-Belarusian maneuvers in the future will repeat the concept of anti-terrorist activities, which would indicate that the Chinese side is building operational awareness to deploy its own forces in a crisis situation for the Lukashenko regime.

It is also possible to increase material support and lessons learned from the PRC to Belarus in countering the opposition. This may also involve training the services, e.g., using the latest Chinese solutions in monitoring oppositionists, but also other more kinetic activities related to dispersing demonstrations. Both countries already have extensive dossiers on such actions.

China is learning to operate in Europe, also militarily

This does not necessarily mean the immediate sending of regular PLA formations but, for example, the transfer of some resources of the People’s Armed Police. In this context, let us note the official statement of the Chinese side that the goals of the maneuvers are also, quote, „(…) to deepen mutual understanding between the two countries and pragmatic cooperation of the armies.”

Understanding and pragmatic cooperation in the case of countries so far apart but united by a common interest of regimes may become significant. It is worth mentioning that Chinese soldiers also trained in Europe. More specifically, before the pandemic, there were exercises where Chinese and German military medics trained in medical support. The Combined Aid 2019 exercise took place, interestingly enough, at the military base in Feldkirchen, Germany.

As we read in the Defence24 text that described them: „Medical teams taking part in the maneuvers are to practice joint command and control and learn to cooperate in the treatment and management of victims of mass outbreaks of large-scale diseases. The exercise aims to improve Soldiers« skills in dealing with such situations in a coordinated manner and to explore new practices and principles. The ongoing maneuvers are the second undertaking of this type. In 2016, the military medical services of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and the German Bundeswehr conducted the first joint exercises based on a fictitious earthquake scenario in the Chinese city of Chongqing.

But let us note that exercise was even before the pandemic and the outbreak of a full-scale war in Ukraine. The Germans only decided on medical matters, not anti-terrorism.

For the PRC and, above all, the PLA, the transfer of troops for maneuvers to Belarus is also a visible demonstration of strategic transport capabilities and the desire to achieve global power projection. This is not the first case of this kind, as it is worth recalling the event from April 2022. In Defence24, Maciej Szopa indicated that „six heavy Chinese Y-20 transport aircraft entered the NATO air zone in Turkey, then flew over Bulgaria, to finally land at Nikola Tesla Airport in Belgrade. The machines most likely brought HQ-22 air defense systems, Chinese equivalents of the S-300 successfully used in Ukraine.”

It was not just an ordinary form of providing military equipment but gaining valuable experience in military logistics, planning, and securing missions of this type in European space. In the case of Belarus, it is not only about military equipment but also about the deployment of soldiers for military exercises and the use of the already mentioned Y-20 transport aircraft (a fact cited by the Chinese propaganda periodical Global Times). Such events should be integrated into a broader picture of the PLA gaining valuable military, analytical, planning, and intelligence experience.

China's Intelligence Appetite for Europe

We cannot deny that the PRC is increasing its intelligence interest in Europe, as the heads of numerous counterintelligence agencies from across the continent reported. Every military undertaking, from transport to maneuvers, is an excellent opportunity to collect more resources for your intelligence services - from the operational dimension to intelligence aspects at the strategic level - figuratively speaking - from the assessment of specific infrastructure facilities, Western behavior, etc., to probing the reactions of entire countries and defense systems.

At this point, a working hypothesis can be put forward as to whether such maneuvers with the Belarusians will not be the basis for, for example, the appearance of a classic Chinese SIGINT base in our region. It seems to be a distant matter, as most attention is paid to this Russian and Belarusian infrastructure. In this matter, the fears of the authorities in the Kremlin that the Chinese will not only look to the West but also to the Russians themselves and their military potential are real.

But let us note the case of Cuba, where relations with the host allowed the Russians and Chinese to develop specific rules of a standard intelligence game. This turn of events may be facilitated by Russia’s further military weakening and the even more desperate expectation of Chinese military assistance. One thing you can be sure of is that the will to build such installations most likely exists among decision-makers in Beijing, similar to the hardware and, above all, financial capabilities.

It will be essential to note whether there will be something like a cyclical nature of Belarusian-Chinese training. In the event of more excellent saturation with such maneuvers, the authorities in Minsk may decide, for example, to provide an official facility for something like a Chinese training mission because it could not function efficiently only based on the infrastructure of its own diplomatic mission. Simultaneously, the appearance of such a facility would have to involve accepting, for example, increased investments in communications technologies (hardware). This would be a direct path to the appearance of a Chinese „electronic ear” listening to NATO’s eastern flank.

Significantly, the strengthening of NATO’s presence in this region, the weakening of Chinese cooperation with the countries of the area (e.g., Lithuania), and, above all, the presence of the US must place this type of Chinese SIGINT needs at a high priority. However, two factors would have to be present to make this possible - the mentioned further and significant weakening of the Russian side’s capabilities towards the PRC and the decision of the Belarusian regime itself, supported by increased frequency of similar military maneuvers/exercises. Another aspect is Chinese-Belarusian-Russian cooperation in the context of HUMINT in the directions of countries neighboring Belarus.

"Laundering" Chinese military assistance to Russia

We should also consider that such military maneuvers are also a path to increased further cooperation in the arms industry. However, whether we are talking about bilateral cooperation or one with a hidden dimension remains an open question. Because Belarus may well be used for transfers of Chinese weapons and equipment, but not directly to Russia. We are bearing in mind that Lukashenko’s regime supported Russian aggression against Ukraine not only in terms of providing territory (including infrastructure) and airspace.

Several reports showed that the Belarusian material and equipment space could also strengthen the Russian aggressor. For example, in 2022, we read in Defence24: „The weapons and military equipment resources transferred to Moscow came from Belarusian warehouses in the Minsk region, in the central part of the country. In addition to T-72A tanks, Russia delivered 60 infantry fighting vehicles and 53 Ural trucks. Mentioned supplies were transported to railway stations in the Belgorod and Rostov regions, i.e., close to the border with Ukraine, wrote Belarusian Hajun on Telegram.”

Equally, in a moment, for instance, the Chinese ammunition and even vehicles may be delivered to the Belarusian troops. Still, after a shorter or longer period, they disappear and end up, for example, on the front in the Ukrainian Donbas or in the occupied Crimea. The authorities in Beijing would indicate that Belarus« purchases complied with the standards of G-2-G agreements in the case of arms issues. Still, the Chinese side later had no official influence on intergovernmental relations between Lukashenko and Putin.

For China’s global partners, such an attitude could allow it to shift responsibility for supporting Russia’s aggression. For Moscow, it would mean an essential strengthening of its troops struggling with equipment problems. In turn, Belarus would still accept its pariah position in international relations but would retain significant political, economic, and military support from the PRC and Russia. Finally, two permanent members of the UN Security Council would take care of this country, protecting it from possible sanctions or helping to circumvent them in the context of participating in a kind of laundering of Chinese „military assistance” to Russia.

Dynamic situation

The situation surrounding the „Eagle Assault - 2024” maneuvers is, therefore, extraordinarily dynamic and should be placed in a broader perspective than just the individual ignition of emotions in the infosphere. The PRC has strategic interests in our region and is increasingly involved in going beyond the sphere of discussions about typically economic, infrastructure, and technological issues. Hence, an increasingly frequent form of emphasis on various intelligence tools, including going beyond classic activities in the cyber domain ( cyber espionage ) and focusing attention on scientific and technological intelligence espionage through the development of, e.g., Chinese HUMINT activity to gain more political and military information.

The actions in Serbia and now in Belarus signal this in yet another context, namely the ability to build planning and operational space when it comes to force projection. Moreover, carried out in the soft underbelly of NATO in the Balkans and the now strategic region of NATO’s eastern flank. Therefore, we expect a probable increase in such shares in the future and we need to react now - from analytical actions to other states tools. So, when completely new tools for China’s actions may open up, we will become better aware of how meaningful the connections between the transatlantic and Indo-Pacific security areas are.